Understanding the nuances behind Jaishankar's statements on the India-China border issue is vital for grasping the entire picture. In his recent address to Lok Sabha, he left out crucial elements that warrant attention and may reflect a lack of transparency regarding the ongoing crisis.
New Delhi: Amidst the ongoing tensions along the India-China border, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently made a statement addressing the crisis in Lok Sabha on December 3. While his comments shed light on some aspects of the situation, it is equally important to examine what was left unspoken and the potential inconsistencies within his narrative.
Jaishankar acknowledged the historical reality that China unlawfully occupies approximately 38,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in Aksai Chin stemming from the 1962 war. He also highlighted Pakistan’s cession of 5,180 square kilometers of Indian territory to China in 1963, thereby underscoring the complex history behind the border dispute. Despite years of negotiations, he pointed out that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains a point of contention, with neither side fully agreeing on its delineation. However, he left the audience questioning: if the LAC exists, why isn’t India's map publicly available?
Moreover, Jaishankar’s assertion that “the House is well aware of the circumstances leading up to the violent clashes in Galwan Valley in June 2020” misses the mark. The only notable statement from Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an all-party meeting in June 2020 was a denial of any Indian territory being infiltrated. Hence, this presumption must be challenged.
During his address, Jaishankar emphasized diplomatic frameworks such as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) established in 2012 and the 2013 agreement on border defense cooperation, emphasizing their roles in maintaining peace and order. However, he conveniently omitted mentioning the informal summits held between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping. Notably, the 2018 Wuhan summit focused on the very border issues that continue to plague the relationship today, particularly in the aftermath of the Doklam standoff.
He then highlighted three principles that must govern the interactions between both nations: adherence to the LAC, no unilateral alterations to the status quo, and compliance with past agreements. However, this assertion raises several concerns: which LAC is being referred to, given there is not a universally accepted one? Additionally, it is critical to note that China noticeably altered the status quo in 2020, and India has not pursued a return to the previously established status.
Jaishankar proceeded to talk about the recent “agreement” reached on October 21, 2024, regarding Depsang and Demchok. He claimed that the local situation and bilateral relations influenced these discussions since the last disengagement agreement at Hot Springs. While he framed this as a beneficial development, the Chinese have yet to label it as an “agreement,” raising questions about its legitimacy. The ambiguity surrounding the situation in these areas continues to cloud the effectiveness of such diplomatic efforts.
The minister added that the resumption of patrolling in traditional areas is ongoing, yet he did not explicitly confirm that normal patrols have resumed, leaving the narrative vague. Additionally, no discussions have surfaced regarding the influx of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) patrols in Arunachal Pradesh, a region that previously faced no such presence.
At a recent ASEAN meeting, Jaishankar mentioned discussions between India's Raksha Mantri and the Chinese Defense Minister regarding disengagement and confidence-building measures. However, the term “de-escalation” has yet to be utilized by the Chinese, leading to skepticism about the effectiveness of these talks.
Moving further back, Jaishankar referred to earlier parliamentary statements on the border situation without providing substantial insights into them. Statements from September 2020 and February 2021 lacked depth and failed to invite comprehensive discussion or debate.
Highlighting the historical context, Jaishankar recounted numerous border frictions dating back decades. However, it is puzzling why he cited incidents before 1962 when contemporary issues are more relevant. Notably, there was no mention of the PLA's intrusion in Chumar in 2014 or the 2017 Doklam crisis, both pivotal instances in understanding the current geopolitical landscape.
As Jaishankar touched upon the recent understanding surrounding Depsang and Demchok, he emphasized the goal of restoring traditional patrolling practices and allowing civilian grazing. However, his phrasing failed to address the critical question of what “return to status quo ante bellum” entails for India, particularly in terms of sovereignty and security.
In his summary of the ongoing border frictions, Jaishankar concluded that temporary and limited measures were implemented to avoid further conflicts. However, such bureaucratic language often masks the reality of the situation, as these measures seem to imply the establishment of buffer zones, restricting Indian patrols from areas previously accessed, raising fears of a long-term alteration of the status quo.
In essence, while Jaishankar’s statements provide some insight into the India-China border crisis, they also highlight the importance of recognizing the gaps in his narrative. For a comprehensive understanding of the situation, one must question the omissions and misrepresentations that might reflect a broader trend of opacity in the Indian government’s approach to foreign policy vis-à-vis China.
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